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  Pocas ideas y actividades han recibido elogios tan hiperbólicos como 
las presentadas en el mundo por Hernando de Soto sobre la informalidad. 
Premios Nobel en economía, presidentes de varios países, revistas muy 
importantes y organizaciones multilaterales han respaldado el impulso del 
registro de propiedad de los pobres, particularmente sus viviendas, como 
la clave para lanzar una revolución económica mundial desde abajo. En 
este trabajo presentamos el respaldo institucional de esas ideas, la 
sustancia analítica de los principales argumentos, la precisión descriptiva 
de las instituciones operando en el tercer Mundo y los resultados de la 
aplicación de los programas de titulación promovidos. De esta manera, 
evaluamos la relación entre la difusión y el poder de una idea con su 





Few ideas and activities have received as hyperbolic praise as those 
presented by Hernando de Soto on informality. Nobel prizes in economics, 
presidents of various countries, important magazines, and multilateral 
organizations have endorsed this author’s impulse to the official 
registration of the poor’s property, particularly, their homes, as the key to 
launch a worldwide economic revolution from below. In this paper we 
present the institutional backing of those ideas, the analytic substance of 
the main arguments involved, the descriptive accuracy of the institutions 
operating in the Third World, and the results of their application. In this 
way, we evaluate the relation between the spread and power of an idea 
with its formal content, and its effectiveness to change the world of the 
poor.  
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I.  THE BACKING OF AN IDEA 
 
The outstanding trajectory of Hernando de Soto is, no doubt, the result 
of exceptional capabilities,
1 but also of some work leading to such place in the 
world of ideas and policy. In a paper that concentrates on methodology, on 
how economists prepare “natural experiments,” Mitchell illustrates such 
exercise with, among other things, a historical account about how the work 
and influence of De Soto was built. I will quote extensively and summarize his 
narrative in the next paragraphs. According to him, “The Peruvian property 
titling experiment was the outcome of political forces at work in Peru, but also 
of the efforts of a small but well organized  political movement in the West, 
neoliberalism.” (2005: 304) The antecedents presented go back to the Free 
Market Project at the University of Chicago Law School in 1946, around the 
time when the Chicago School of Economics was created. He also finds them 
in the Mont Pelerin Society created the following year in Switzerland, a 
country particularly important in the life of De Soto since he lived, studied and 
worked there several years. The Free Market project “provided a prototype for 
the distinctive organizational basis of this effectiveness, the think tank –the 
combination of core ideas and practical proposals for legislation, supported by 




Friedrich Hayek, a key figure in the launching and development of both 
the Project and the Society, met in Lima with De Soto in the late 70s, and 
after the meeting, the account goes, the first introduced the latter to Antony 
                                                 
∗   Full Professor of the Department of Economics, Pontifical Catholic University of 
Peru. Paper presented to the Human Development and Capability Association 
Annual Conference, September 2007, New York.   
1    By those capabilities I mean, as in Sen’s concept, the wide spectrum of 
opportunities he has enjoyed and his great autonomy to decide.  
2   Many institutions copied this pattern: Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise 
Institute, Hudson Institute are mentioned by the author.  
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Fisher, a close collaborator of Hayek and the founder of the Atlas Foundation 
for Economic Research that helped to create De Soto’s Institute for Liberty 
and Democracy (Instituto Libertad y Democracia, ILD). De Soto is quoted 
saying about him that “It was on the basis of his vision that we designed the 
structure of the ILD. He then came to Lima and told us how to structure the 
statutes, how to plan our goals, how to build the foundation, what to expect 
in the short and long term.” (Mitchell 2005: 305)    
 
Among his supporters later on was the billionaire Swiss Stephan 
Schmidheiny who funded the German translation and edition of The Other 
Path, and also the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) that 
developed the tools to “create an advocacy team, identify key issues relevant 
to the target audience, research the issues, establish a goal, create a 
message and an advertising campaign, form grassroots advocates, work with 
the media, and become part of the governmental process (Center for 
International Private Enterprise, 2003).” (Mitchell 2005: 307) In 1984, CIPE 
gave the first grant to the ILD. At the end of 1986 De Soto with his 
collaborators published The Other Path in Spanish, and received the first Sir 
Antony Fisher Award followed by several other prizes, reviews and 
endorsements mostly from European and American neoliberal think tanks, 
soon becoming a best seller. The endorsements came from academics (Milton 
Friedman, Ronald Coase) as well as from politicians (Bill Bradley, David Owen, 
Bill Clinton, Collin L. Powell, and Vicente Fox). 
 
ILD grew quite fast, and participated very actively under García and 
Fujimori governments in the titling program designed by the institute. After 
three years of preparation, in 1998, the World Bank loaned US$38 million to 
help finance ILD’s work. The total budget was US$66 million. (Morris 2004: 
62) The support ended in 2004. The result as stated in the reports of the 
office in charge of titling: 7 million Peruvians benefited (25% of the 
population) and 1’393,096 titles were given (August 1996-June 2004)
3. 
Today, there is a consensus around the need to move into another quite 
different stage, that of post-formalization. (Morris 2004: 158)      
                                                 
3   COFOPRI al día. Año 2, Núm. 1, Lima, junio 2004.  
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That De Soto has been part of this neoliberal world is no secret.
4 
Understanding his own, and we think, significant intellectual peculiarities vis a 
vis his academic mentors and other perspectives on informality requires a 
different study.
5 One of them, perhaps, is that he always insisted in his desire 




Mitchell attributes a political goal to neoliberals, and also to De Soto, 
suggesting that when he uses a property rights approach to analyze, not the 
mining sector or the corporations in general but that of the informal housing 
he is looking for political power.
7 It would be interesting to study the effect of 
De Soto’s thesis on the building of popular support for neoliberalism in the 
countries ILD operates. A partly different thing is the support built for himself 
or the political mentors of his proposals. The social and political backing of 
formalization in Peru is unclear. The candidate for mayor of the city of Lima, 
Jaime Yoshiyama, explicitly supported by Fujimori, presented entitlement as 
one of his main campaign platforms but lost the elections.
8 Fujimori as 
president, also promoted mass entitlement during his 2000 reelection 
campaign and won. Later on, after some well-published inroads as a potential 
candidate for the presidency of Peru De Soto himself reached the conclusion 
that it was not in his best interests to pursue that effort.  
                                                 
4    Although not all the prizes and recipients De Soto has shared with can be 
classified as part or close to the neoliberal perspective, many of the most 
important ones can be seen as members of such political and academic current. 
Examples are the Prizes by the Goldwater Award (Past recipients: Margaret 
Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, Milton Friedman, Barry Goldwater, and Friedrich 
Hayek); the Adam Smith Award (Past recipients: James Buchanan, Douglas 
North, Harold Demsetz, Armen Alchian, Allan Metzler, Robert Barro, and Alan 
Greenspan); the Freedom Prize by The Max Schmidheiny Fundation, the Milton 
Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty add to that list.       
5   Informality as a topic had already wide circulation before De Soto’s books were 
published. (McNeill 2004)  
6   For example, the dedication in The Other Path includes the following expression: 
“And of course, to my left-wing friends, whose ideals I share, in the hope that 
we might also agree on ways to achieve them.” See also (1990: 256-7) 
7    He himself considers his 1990 publication “a political political book which is 
based on evidence and will doubtless need to be rewritten some years from 
now.” (De Soto 1990: 14-5)   
8   Calderon (2006: 189, 191) Resistance against the political use by Fujimori of 
the formalization campaign also had its effects, and the new decentralization 
process in Peru does not allow the old centralized, and we would add, 
unavoidable top-down method of titling. (Morris 2004: 158).  
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A question that we will not answer become obvious asking. Being so 
massive the lack of property registration in the world, to the point of 
explaining nothing less that “why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails 
everywhere else;” so easy the remedy, property registration already 
implemented by ILD in so many countries; and so powerful the informals’ 
“invisible revolution in the Third World” already in place why is that this 
proposal has not resulted in a massive social mobilizations around the world, 
and some politically organized form of, for instance, “people’s capitalism”?  
 
In the following two parts we will try to explain some of the limitation in 
the power of De Soto’s ideas by summarizing the economic, and a few 
historical elements of his thesis and proposals. Today, there is a growing 
skepticism concerning the benefits of the programs that were implemented in 
the last two decades; we have to find why. Keefer, of the World Bank, 
manifested his concern some years ago about the “great existing skepticism” 
on the results of property registration programs. (2004: 7) Are there reasons 
for this? In the following pages we will establish that there are grounds for 
such thinking.     
 
II.  ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE CALLING 
 
On what theoretical and moral base and on what evidence of efficacy is 
De Soto’s proposal sustained? In this following section we deal with aspects 
relative to the conceptual rigour and moral mandate that the author conveys 
in his two books.
9   
 
II.1. The  grand  view   
 
The two books already indicated, and the property legalizing job around 
the world are the matter of compliments gathered in the first section. The first 
of the two books, The Other Path (1990), made De Soto a pioneer on the 
issue of formalization through property registration programs. With De Soto’s 
most recent book, the Mystery of Capital (2000) we are before a proposal that 
                                                 
9   A general view of the last book on Iguiñiz (2001a).  
  7 
reaffirms the essential argument. Part of the proposal’s appeal is its ambition 
and the potential social amplitude of its calling. For example, he will say: 
“With its victory over communism, capitalism’s old agenda for economic 
progress is exhausted and requires a new set of commitments. It makes no 
sense continuing to call for open economies without facing the fact that the 
economic reforms underway open the doors only for small and globalized 
elites and leave out most of humanity. At present, capitalist globalization is 




One can appreciate that the calling is for the redemption of the 
excluded and that the flag is libertarian. De Soto’s objective is to instil 
capitalism with “good laws”; in his own words improve: “…an economic 
system which is exceptionally sensitive to the opportunities for development.” 
(1990, 184) 
11 There is, besides, a look at capitalism: “I am as aware as any 
anticapitalist of how representational systems, particular those of capitalism, 
have been used to exploit and conquer, how they have left the many at the 
mercy of the few.” (2000, 247) The answer is some sort of “popular 
capitalism”, and the attack to what the author considers is the presence of 
“mercantilism” in the Third World. We will come back to this point later on.  
 
Both books have the courage and the limitation of presenting, on the 
one hand, a long term proposal that points to systemic-worldwide issues and, 
on the other, to accelerate a revolution already happening “everywhere else” 
starting a massive program of registration of informal property that is simple, 
cheap and of immediate implementation. It is about registering under the 
current legal norms the property that the poor have accumulated in the cities, 
fostering household mortgages, obtaining credits and amplifying the scale of 
production of the small and microbusinessmen. That is the immediate path 
that is proposed for the world’s poor to escape their present poverty. This 
                                                 
10   In a few pages I will explain a crucial image of the argument: The bell jar. 
11   “I am not a die-hard capitalist. I do not view capitalism as a credo. Much more 
important to me are freedom, compassion for the poor, respect for the social 
contract, and equal opportunity. But for the moment to achieve this goal, 
capitalism is the only game in town. It is the only system we know that provides 
us with the tools required to create a massive surplus value.” (2000, 228)    
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would trigger a process where new businessmen would emerge, although this 
time they would not be mercantilists, which is the base of De Soto’s 
overflowing optimism with respect to the possibility of changing the workings 
of world capitalism starting a transformation in each country.
12         
 
In what follows we present a very succinct vision of the conceptual 
proposal emphasizing the economic aspects in what is, to a great extent, a 
juridical proposal. We feel that a journey through the economic, historical, 
legal and moral dimensions in those two books will help us understand to a 
great degree the difficulties to include the poor and even the rich in a 
movement that seeks the affirmation of the rights of private property.  
 
II.2.  The question and the answer 
 
As we annotated above, the question that looms over the latest book is 
certainly ambitious and it is presented in the cover as a sub heading in The 
Mystery of Capital: “Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else.” The answer is directly sought in the world of the urban 
poor in underdeveloped countries. In his own words, a redistribution of power 
is necessary: “The fundamental problem that the latter face is not that people 
are invading and clogging the cities, that public services are inadequate, that 
garbage is piling up, that ragged children beg in the streets, or even that the 
benefits of macroeconomic reform programs are not reaching the majority. 
Many of these difficulties existed in Europe (and also in the United States) and 
w e r e  e v e n t u a l l y  o v e r c o m e .  T h e  r e a l  p r o b l e m  i s  t h a t  w e  h a v e  s t i l l  n o t  
recognized that all these difficulties constitute a sea change in expectation: As 
the poor flow into cities and create extralegal social contracts, they are forcing 
a major redistribution of power.” (2000, 102-103) 
13  
                                                 
12    Such optimism does not take into consideration the extremely different 
competitive power of the informal industrialists in the mercantilist period and of 
the current micro-entrepreneurs in the Third World.  
13    The argument on the possibilities of the redistribution of world power should 
consider the economic power of currently informal producers to compete not 
only with the mercantilist businessmen in their own countries of the Third World, 
but also with world sized firms. We will not deal with this crucial point.   
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  What is needed for poor proprietors of poor countries to a have a 
response capacity to globalization?  The answer: a legal system that allows 
them to convert their properties into capital. We will return to this matter 
later on for it makes up the base of De Soto’s proposal. The answer that the 
author puts forward is repeated several times throughout the book. One of 
them is the following: “The reason capitalism has triumphed in the West and 
sputtered in the rest of the world is because most of the assets in western 
nations have been integrated into one formal representational system.” 
(2000, 52) Hence, the goal is to generate a legal system in each country that 
integrates the norms of the informal world with those of the formal into one 
where the properties of the poor are represented. It is where ‘dead’ capital 
becomes ‘living’ capital. As De Soto points out: “The poor inhabitants of these 
nations —five-sixths of humanity— do have things, but they lack the process 
to represent their property and create capital. They have houses but not 
titles; crops but not deeds; businesses but not statues of incorporation. It is 
the unavailability of these essential representations that explains why people 
who have adapted very other Western invention, from the paper clip to the 
nuclear reactor, have not been able to produce sufficient capital to make their 
domestic capitalism work. 
 
This is the mystery of capital. Solving it requires an understanding of 
why Westerners, by representing assets with titles, are able to see and draw 
out capital from them.” (2000, 6-7) 
 
II.3.  The economic assumptions of the argument  
 
Why does informality exist? To answer this question, we will focus on 
the economic aspects of both the problem and the answer.
14 On this matter, 
De Soto keeps a certain ambiguity when it comes to costs but he ends up 
assuming a diagnostic of the situation that is essential to justify the activities 
of ILD, those of adequately registering the property of homes and micro-
enterprises of the poor.  
                                                 
14    We leave aside, on purpose, the important subject of the relation between 
property rights and development. On this matter see Barzel (1997), Chang 
(2006), Rodrik, et. al. (2002).  
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After making a list of some of the diverse types of costs of informality, 
he points out the following: “Therefore, contrary to what one might believe, 
invaders pay a very high price for the land they occupy. Since they have no 
money, they pay for it with their own human capital. We are living in a costly 
society, one which forces its members to assume countless burdens, not only 
if they want to enjoy the benefits of formality but also if they prefer 
informality.” (1990, 26) The existence of three costs is presented: the cost of 
staying informal, the cost of staying formal and the cost of transiting from 
informality to formality. In De Soto’s work the latter is the most important to 
explain the existence of informality for it is the only one in which costs are 
estimated. That implies that one supposes, without doing comparative 
calculations, that the first cost is greater than the second. 
 
a.  Legal barriers to legalization?  
The barriers to the legalization of property end up being the central 
aspect of the impediments to fully legalize property. The legal barrier is of an 
economic nature; it is expensive to go legal especially to those that are trying 
to keep their very small business alive. Our point is not whether it is 
convenient or not to reduce the cost of the procedures in terms of time and 
money. It is obvious that it is convenient to do so, that it is better for the poor 
to have all the possible safeties; that they should be freer, and that such 
freedom should include the power of alienating their property. Our argument 
revolves around the importance of this aspect in the life of citizens, and that 
of the informal poor in particular. What follows is a summary of a number of 
arguments in De Soto’s books that show that together with undeniable but 
ever lesser barriers to formalization there are reasons to think that 
formalization is not an objective that is very anxiously sought by the majority 
of the informal poor. In the case of most micro-entrepreneurs it is because it 
is not economically convenient for them at the moment. In the case of home-
owners because, as we will show below, they already have most of the 
security o property they need to live. This may explain why the proposal for 
formalization has not been taken up as a social cause as important as the 
world transforming ambitions that the author expresses might suggest.   
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To sustain this we may set out from two points, one analytical and one 
historical. On the conditions for the existence of informality the author points 
out: “We can say that informal activities burgeon when the legal system 
imposes rules which exceed the socially accepted legal framework —does not 
honor the expectations, choices, and preferences of those whom it does not 
admit within its framework— and when the state does not have sufficient 
coercive authority.” (1990, 12) From this, we can highlight that we are before 
norms that cannot be complied by existing very small business or by those 
who want to create them. We could say that the state’s coercive capacity 
therefore finds itself useless, for if exercised the subject of coercion would 
disappeared. The legalist bias is evident when the reasons that lie beneath 
that impossibility of compliance are not highlighted, for example, the 
difficulties to compete economically in conditions of legal equality.     
 
I n  h i s t o r i c a l  t e r m s ,  t o  D e  S o t o ,  i n f o r m a l s  h a v e  b e e n  a t t a c k i n g  w i t h  
great courage that great barrier that blocks the road to formality; so epic is 
the battle waged by the poor of Peru and of the world that it is extensively 
narrated in the first of the books. “The first part of this book describes how el 
Peru profundo, ‘the unknown Peru,’ began a long and sustained battle to 
integrate itself into formal life, a battle so gradual that its effects are only just 
beginning to be seen. We appear to be witnessing the most important 
rebellion against the status quo ever waged in the history of independent 
Peru.” (1990, 13) 
 
  But compliance of the existing law, which according to De Soto, is the 
frustrated aspiration, particularly of informal producers, has its costs; that is 
why breaking the law is economically convenient. “As we shall see later, it is 
more than likely that, economically speaking, the people directly involved in 
these activities (as well as society in general) are better off when they violate 
the laws than when they respect them.” (1990, 11-12) As a matter of fact, we 
shall see that this hypothesis is rejected when the time comes to elaborate 
the argument, the ‘narrative’ of the popular epic. If it is cheaper to break the 
law, why would informals want to formalize? If informality is “…a grey area 
which has a long frontier with the legal world and in which individuals take  
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refuge when the cost of obeying the law outweighs the benefit” (1990, 12) 
why would they want to register their firms and acquire the visibility that 
would allow the state to monitor them?  
 
  De Soto’s response is strictly economic and it is rather odd on two 
fronts. It is based on two affirmations that we consider empirically 
questionable. On the one hand, he has to point out that evading the laws of 
the formal system is more expensive than complying with them. For the 
author “…the life of the extralegal entrepreneur turns out to be far more 
costly and full of daily hassles than that of the legal businessman.” (2000, 83) 
This affirmation is fundamental to his whole argument and, in consequence, 
to his main recommendation of policy: the registering of property. Without it 
there is no sense in affirming that informals evade the law because they are 
not allowed, because they are prevented, to operate under the law. That is 
the “bell jar” which is mentioned by the author throughout the book and 
against which, like flies before windows, the informals crash in their sacrificed 
attempt to enter it.    
 
  De Soto’s general proposal consists on ‘lifting and withdrawing’ the bell 
jar in which formal and developed capitalism resides so that formals and 
informals may mix. It is a legal jar since “Braudel’s bell jar is made not of 
taxes, maps, and computers but of laws.” (2000, 156) 
 
  That is, the bell jar does not allow informals to enter but that also 
expels some who are inside, those who cannot live with the costs of legality. 
If some cannot live with such costs, why some would like to assume them? 
This contradictory way of seeing things is everywhere in the book. For 
example, “…Two-thirds of the world’s population…have no alternative but live 
outside the law.” (2000, 74) De Soto’s book is full of expressions that show 
that bell jar as a symbol of the hostility of the formal world towards the 
informal. “Blocked from entering the bell jar, the poor could never get close to 
the legal property mechanisms necessary to generate capital.” (2000, 113) 
More than once, the author uses a term that is very expressive of his vision 
when it comes to the problem: “apartheid.” This way, informals are “…  
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marked off as sharply from its westernized elite as black and white South 
Africans were once separated by apartheid.” (2000, 15) The consequences of 
this socio-legal regime are presented in the following way by De Soto: “The 
disastrous economic effects of this legal apartheid are most strikingly visible 
in the lack of the formal property rights over real estate.” (2000, 83) The 
great problem to face then is the registering of property in the case of 
households. We will evaluate below the conceptual and empirical support 
behind such decisive statement. 
 
But, how are they prevented from operating under the law? Here a 
reasoning that has been well known since The Other Path intervenes. It is the 
cost of procedures that stands between informals and legality. To sustain this 
one finds the famous calculations on the steps that one has to inevitably 
follow to legalize property and the cost in terms of time and money that it all 
encompasses. The proposal that has helped his fame the most around the 
world is probably the one dealing with state bureaucratization when it comes 
to registering property. One of the multiple expressions of that supposed fact 
is the following: “…many countries make the obstacles to entering the legal 
property systems so daunting and expensive that few migrants could ever 
make their way through the red tape – as many as fourteen years and 
seventy-seven bureaucratic procedures at thirty-one public and private 
agencies…” (2000, 82-83) 
 
  In the afore mentioned book the conclusion that is reached is that 
“Each of the 159 bureaucratic steps which residents must complete in order to 
legalize their settlement, receive title to their lots, and incorporate the 
neighbourhood to the city —a process which takes an average of twenty years 
— enhance the security and stability of the rights acquired.” (1990, 24)  
 
  If becoming formal is difficult, so is staying formal once the property of 
the company has been registered. For De Soto, “…it is very nearly as difficult 
to stay legal as it is to become legal.” (2000, 21) Such affirmation is only 
valid if the costs of staying legal are higher than those if one were to stay  
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informal, as common sense indicates in the world of micro-enterprises. He 
does not provide precise calculations.  
 
If, in effect, it were to be more expensive to comply with tax and labour 
laws than to evade them, as common sense would indicate, informals would 
not be so interested in becoming legal and De Soto’s whole argument 
concerning informals being forced to and having no option other than operate 
illegally would fall apart. The policy of the legalization of businesses would 
consist in forcing them to do so, except for some few informals that are 
already in a position of sufficient competitiveness to insert themselves in the 
formal market, that had in mind businesses of the scale and characteristics 
that such formality demands and that had a reasonable fear to the application 
of fines or expropriation of goods.  
 
b.  The image of the state in underdeveloped countries 
For us, another fault in De Soto’s argument seems to reside in his view 
of the state and of the corporations in underdeveloped countries. In our 
judgment, always within economic reasoning, it is not adequate to consider 
that there is no other method of legalizing property other than having to go 
through the via crucis that De Soto and his team experienced when legalizing 
the business that they created for experimental reasons. If the procedures 
were as long and costly in time and money as he points out there wouldn’t be 
so many new stores and small and medium formal businesses each year. 
Even had the author not exaggerated about these steps if one where to 
strictly follow the bureaucratic instructions of property registration we find it 
doubtful that someone else in the world, apart from ILD and De Soto, has 
followed them. In our view, these steps concerning the registering of business 
property have as an objective to show the existence of a type of state that 
prevents the legalization of property more than to put into evidence an every 
day reality in the epic struggle of the informals. De Soto’s state is defined as 
mercantilist and exceedingly strict when it comes to the fulfilment of 
regulations. “Mercantilism was a politically administered economy in which 
economic agents were subject to specific, detailed regulation.” (1990, 202) It 
is hard to imagine in Latin America the existence of a state where political  
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power is above economic power and if the latter were to subject itself to strict 
regulations. The author’s viewpoint results from what for him is a fact: “The 
parallel between twentieth century Peru and the European mercantilism of 
earlier centuries is a valid one.” (1990, 201) This subject should take us to an 
analysis of the historic vision that the author has of Latin America, and other 
underdeveloped countries, something which escapes our purpose.     
 
If this vision on the status of large companies in underdeveloped 
countries is difficult to accept, so is the one according to which informals are 
also subjected to this administrative strictness. Everyone knows that when it 
comes to state bureaucratic procedures there are informal middlemen, known 
in Peru as tramitadores, that may be lawyers and that have as an invaluable 
asset the knowledge of bureaucracy. There are also a set of informal 
practices, like paying bribes to speed up the process, that people normally 
turn to facilitate such procedures. On this point, De Soto has forgotten about 
the ingenuity of the informals as well as of the bureaucrats and government 
bodies even though throughout The  Other Path he describes this state 
flexibility quite well.
15 The author has forgotten to study empirically the 
workings of the state that really do exist in underdeveloped countries and 
neither did he ask the hundreds of thousands of small formal businesses how 
they had attained such formality if they had it. The calculations concerning 
the procedures could well show the inaction of a state drowning in its own 
incoherencies which De Soto often puts into evidence and not the existence of 
an exceedingly strict entity when it comes to complying with procedures; 
maybe of a Prussian style, which the informals battle against forcing it to 
incur in those same incoherencies.  
 
Two wrongs don’t make a right. The consequence of what we consider 
two mistakes of awareness concerning the reality of underdeveloped 
countries, the relative cost of behaving according to law and the procedural 
strictness of the state, is that the more common sense explanation about the 
                                                 
15   Given the anti-state character of the author that flexibility and informality of the 
state are presented as retreats and defeats of a state that, supposedly, at some 
point was very strict when it came the compliance of laws but that was forced 
by migrants to be more flexible. (1990) On this, (Iguñíz (2001b).  
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existence of informality gains ground without resistance. Obeying the law is 
more expensive for micro-enterprises than evading it. On that same line, 
informal businessmen exist simply because it is cheaper to evade the law, 
including the cost of ‘bribes’, than to obey it and because of it, it is not 
convenient for the majority of them to become legalized. This does not 
necessarily hold for homes, since they already pay for most of the taxes 
before becoming registered. Then, this is no great mystery and therefore 
specific efforts, but not excessive ones, are required, like the ones made by 
the ILD, to get poor people to want to legalize their home. There are, indeed, 
two registration moments, and types. One is home registration, where there 
is no great economic difficulty, only an administrative one however costly. 
Staying formal as a homeowner is not a big issue, unless one is hiding 
something at home. The second is small firms registration where the relative 
cost of such business activity, and not mainly that of  registration, count when 
deciding to stay informal or not.   
  
II.4.  The legitimacy of evading the law and the moral mandate  
 
An additional reason concerning what we consider the limited social 
appeal of De Soto’s proposal can be that it affirms the value of the rights of 
property to those who have prospered breaking them. The many stories in 
The Other Path are tales of land invasions, institutional ruptures. As Chang 
recalls “there are many examples in history where the preservation of certain 
property rights proved harmful for economic development while violation of 
certain existing property rights (and the creation of new property rights) was 
actually beneficial for economic development.” (2006, 7)  
 
a.  The legitimacy of evading the law 
De Soto’s proposal assumes the acceptance of property rights obtained 
through invasions and his books can also be seen as great justifications for 
breaking the rights of property, as celebrations of ‘original accumulation’. His 
argument is once again that informals had no option but to invade someone 
else’s lands, they were forced to do so because of the resistance of the 
existing legal order to make housing accessible. “Inevitably, migrants do not  
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so much break the law as the law breaks them —and they opt out of the 
system.” (2000, 21)  
 
Hence, it appears as if there is come sort of moral base for going 
against the law. If so, we have yet another reason to explain why being 
officially legal cannot be an aspiration for informals. As a matter of fact, their 
history is one of progress based on evasion if not on breaking the law. Why 
would compliance be invariably beneficial? Besides, the evasion of the law by 
those who remain informal today is legitimized by the one carried out when 
the lands were invaded. Compliance with the law and existing norms does not 
have the moral sustenance that would be necessary. As such, the issue of 
economic incentives dealt with above becomes crucial. Even more so if, as we 
will later see, the supposed objectives of informals analyzed by De Soto are 
strictly economic. Actually, a great pragmatism seems to dominate the lives 
of informals when it comes to legality, and the economic reasons for assuming 
codes of conduct, norms and laws gain great importance.
16  
 
Part of that historic reason is the relatively ineffectiveness of 
entitlement programs, at least in Peru, where they have been implemented 
for a longer time. In the third part we show that the dynamic envisioned by 
De Soto so far is not taking place.  
 
b.  A moral mandate to take risks 
De Soto’s proposal is no mere ideological program, like all far reaching 
proposals; it is a call for action, a political one, and, therefore, a moral 
demand. First of all, let’s look at the juridical focus concerning the rights of 
people. The core of the juridical argument is, in accordance with the focus of 
the author, one of meta-rights. Hence, “…the real task in developing and 
former communist countries is not so much to perfect existing rights as to 
give everyone a right to property rights —“meta rights”, if you will.” (2000, 
158) This way, for the author, the right to a certain property is not what is 
important, but the right to property itself is. This tongue twister is crucial for 
                                                 
16    His critique of the culturalist approaches to underdevelopment, valid as they 
may be; don’t allow him to have a more complex and complete view of the 
objectives of the informals.   
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the author’s argument and to us it seems important in order to understand its 
limited social appeal. To him, it is not that important whether people have a 
place to sleep or not, but those who do have, should have the right to carry 
out transactions with their residences. This is important.  
 
  De Soto’s political call is for a grater entrepreneurial initiative from 
property owners through mortgaging. For this, the first and, according to the 
author, unavoidable step is to register property. For the author, this call 
would correspond with the deepest, or at least the most immediate, wishes of 
the poor. “What Peruvians want, first and foremost, is firm property rights, 
reliable transactions, and secure activities. They want facilitative legal 
instruments, which they do not now have.” (1990, 247) Hence we are before 
juridical ends that are at the same time instruments for material progress 
based on entrepreneurial initiative. Other ends, such as acquiring social 
recognition in the neighbourhood, or before provincial relatives, or others, do 
not appear as reasons to register property. De Soto’s call in shanty towns is 
to convert assets into capital. And to turn them into capital in the best 
economic terms possible supposes placing oneself in a legal situation that will 
allow losing the house: “A great part of the potential value of legal property is 
derived from the possibility of forfeiture.” (2000, 55) This demand clashes 
with a known vindication of the majority of residents: not having to let go of 
their houses. The history of their struggle will be much better explained by 
remembering this than by imagining other objectives. 
 
  Actually, the author calls for a commitment of the people with the 
progress of society. Not only are informals unnecessarily poor but they are 
accomplices of upholding an obsolete social order. “People with nothing to 
lose are trapped in the grubby basement of the precapitalist world.” (2000, 
56) But those called on by De Soto are precisely those who have something to 
lose. “It is the property system that draws out the abstract potential from 
buildings and fixes it in representations that allow us to go beyond passively 
using the buildings only as shelters.” (2000, 60) According to him, they insist 
in having houses… to live in! De Soto seems scandalized. The dimension of 
human family development is lost before the pre-eminence of a social upper  
  19 
objective. Housing is seen with disdain as mere refuge. The commitment to 
which De Soto calls for “…is better understood when backed up by a pledge of 
property, whether it be a mortgage, a lien, or any other form of security that 
protects the other contracting party.” (2000, 56) The moneylender’s security 
is essential for progress. But what about that of the home-owner’s? It is clear 
that the one who has lent the money must be protected. If the house is not 
mortgaged then one is not collaborating with social change because “Assets 
themselves have no effect on social behaviour: They do not produce 
incentives; they make no person accountable, no contract enforceable.” 
(2000, 157) The eventuality of losing the family home is not that strange for 
countries that are ahead of us. Hence the homeless. “Thus the formal 
property systems of the West have bestowed mixed blessings. Although they 
provided hundred of millions of citizens with a stake in the capitalist game, 
what made this stake meaningful was that it could be lost.” (2000, 55) The 
frankness of the author is quite clear.  
 
The juridical system that De Soto proposes, which is the same as the 
one that presently regulates us form the constitution, has the objective of 
favouring the alienability of property. “Although they are established to 
protect both the security of ownership and that of transactions, it is obvious 
that Western system emphasize the latter.” (2000, 62) The author goes on to 
say: “In most developing countries by contrast, the law and official agencies 
are trapped by early colonial and Roman law, which tilt toward protecting 
ownership. They have become custodians of the wishes of the dead.” (2000, 
62) For the author, the matter is to challenge the legal system that will not 
allow them so easily to sell their homes. After all, “Formal property’s 
contribution to mankind is not the protection of ownership; squatters, housing 
organizations, mafias, and even primitive tribes manage to protect their 
assets quite efficiently.” (2000, 59) Hence we are before a right that is given 
with a certain duty. The duty of mortgaging. That is the mandate, capitalize!, 
even if it costs the family home. The question de Soto asks is not: Where will 
the poor sleep? 
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  This disconnection between the ends, to live well, safely, without cold 
and without having to depend on others when it comes to where to spend the 
night, and the means, carrying out transactions and risking it weakens the 
appeal of De Soto’s proposal because the dimensions of human development 
which are in good part a basis for legitimize a social order are absent or too 
implicit.   
 
  But is it true that the registration of property is a condition to buy and 
sell homes? What difference in terms of access to credit, tax behaviour or 
human development does it make registering home property under a uniform 
law? We will answer this in the following part.  
 
III.  EFFECTIVENESS OF TITLING  
 
  In this part we are going to present a review of some of the recent 
empirical studies analyzing the effects of titling concerning the home property 
of the poor, with a special focus on what is probably the oldest program 
implemented by De Soto’s ILD in the world. This program, COFOPRI, started 
in Lima in March 1996.
17 Its objectives stressed the access to credit as the 
main road to progress. In 1998 the World Bank enters  the project with 
basically the same view of the problem.
  The program has had significant 
advances, partly supported on previous programs, and to this day, the 
process of massive property registration, is approaching its end.
18 
 
  In what follows we will take into consideration a certain view of the 
process by which the right to property is constructed. As it has been pointed 
out: “The right to property is not absolute, nor is it created in a single act or 
by the actions of a single institution.” (Webb. et. al. 2006: 13). From this 
perspective, the process of formalizing household property has been described 
by recurring to three important moments or steps, even though there are 
                                                 
17   Comisión de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal. For a very brief historical 
summary of the origins, see Calderón (2006: 181-2). 
18   Calderón (2006: 180) considers that the period of extralegal property rights has 
ended after 1’300,000 titles have been provided and registered.  Keefer from 
the World Bank recognizes that what is left are pockets of informal property, 
just the remains. (2004: 9)  
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others of lesser importance but that also have influence in the path towards 
obtaining the maximum possible security. The three moments are invasion, 
title procurement and the registering of the title. 
 
Invasion (43% for the year 2004) and the publicly non-registered, in 
that sense illegal buying (42.4%) are the main sources of informal ownership 
and rights, and also the first step in the achievement and deepening of an 
“expectative property right” (derecho expectaticio).
 19 This right is consented 
and recognized at least by a sector of society and gives the power, to a 
certain point, of using the property terrain and which has expressed itself in 
huge investments in construction, in massive real estate informal 
transactions, and in the whole process of urbanization. Also, this right has 
been enough to establish in households hundreds of thousands if not millions 
of micro businesses most of which disappear in briefs periods of time, but 
reappear constantly. From the mere right not to be evicted they went to 
having their investment and purchases respected. In his pioneering work, De 
Soto has described the legal aspect of such phenomenon in great detail 
(1990). The “legal right” comes later from the granting of titles by some office 
of the state. With that document, the security that one may feel relative to, 
for example, buying and selling informally, is greater. A third stage in the 
construction of property rights consists in registering the title. By registering, 
property becomes more easily tradable for example, “mortgageable.” The 
prolonged and bothersome aspect of the registering process justifies the 
existence of COFOPRI, and not so much the granting of property titles by 
itself since already in 1990 98% of properties benefited from the first two 
rights and only 2% had their property registered. By 2000, the proportion of 
those registered reached 21% (Webb, et.al. 2006: 45)     
 
The three levels are important in terms of the security that proprietors 
may feel, but the differences in security are marginal. In fact, in 2004, those 
who felt “secure” or “very secure” were: 92.6% of those titled and registered 
                                                 
19   That right it is backed by the great social legitimacy of these processes of illegal 
acquisition. We should remember that the 60s and 70s in Latin America were 
times when the legitimacy of private property, and particularly of land was very 
low. Agrarian reforms by the state and private invasions of urban lands were 
common.  
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by COFOPRI, but 89% of those who held a title handed out by the 
municipality, 85.5% of those who obtained the home purchasing it, and 
69.5% of those who had some other “probatory” document. Even 43.8% of 
those who as yet had no document felt their ownership was secure.  (Webb. 
et. al. 2006: 15) 
 
  The evolution of the titling-and-registering process by COFOPRI in the 
last 11years is presented in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 
COFOPRI: Titling 1996-2006 
Years Yearly  Cumulative 
1,996 33,742  33,742 
1,997 129,392  163,134 
1,998 149,574  312,708 
1,999 322,053  634,761 
2,000 419,846 1,054,607 
2,001 115,599 1,170,206 
2,002 123,827 1,294,033 
2,003 70,401 1,364,434 
2,004 65,598 1,430,032 
2,005 71,300 1,501,332 




  The figures indicate the relatively slow initial process, the acceleration 
at the end of the last decade, and the deceleration in the last period. This 
one, seems the beginning of a new phase in which the growth of titling will 
practically be vegetative. Even more, the marginal cost of doing so rises 
according to the informal proprietor population becoming geographically more 
dispersed. In 2003, the proportion with registered titles only reached 32%.
20  
                                                 
20    There are reasons to think that there was both a pile up and an electoral 
objective by Fujimori that pushed the entitlement process forward. In the two  
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The work of COFOPRI consisted in putting back on a sound footing and 
registering titles that already existed and also registering those who had no 
previous title. In 1990, before COFOPRI’s program, it is estimated that 
already half the properties had a legal property title and a 48% had an 
expectative title
 , but it is estimated that only 2% of the properties had the 
title inscribed in the public register. The difficult to register due to the 
complexity and the expensiveness of the procedures is an explanation for that 
delay.
21       
 
  In the following, we will show some of the effects of entitlement in 
general, and then, compare them to other previous and parallel forms of 
property in Peru. First, we will show the effect on the access to credit; second, 
on other economic variables, and finally on some proxy indicators of human 
development.  
 
III.1.  Effect on access to credit 
 
The proposal that has been presented by De Soto most insistently in his 
books is that of titling in order to mortgage homes and to obtain capital. A 
great number of pages relate to this issue. The motto of The Mistery of Capital 
is clear: go and mortgage! For this, the titling of property is necessary.
22 His 
books, especially his latest, deal with all matters related to mortgaging, such 
as guarantees, the value of homes, residences verifiable addresses, security 
for those who lend money, etc. The asset that De Soto studies the most in 
this second book, and where he places most of his expectations is therefore, 
homes. His efforts have left aside, at least for a while, the problem of the 
informality of micro businesses. To deliver property titles to the inhabitants of 
homes in the cities of underdeveloped countries is, as we have seen above, as 
the starting point of a true world revolution. With the use of homes as 
                                                                                                                                                   
most electoral important years, 1999 and 2000, almost half of the total 
registered titles were produced. 
21    One should not lose sight that the argument about the convenience of 
registering that we have presented in the previous section of the paper refers to 
the registering of small and micro businesses, not households. 
22   “The placing of real estate property as a guarantee of a loan is a clearly defined 
objective of the policy of formalization that, also, has publicized this use as one 
of the principal benefits, if not the principal.” (Calderón 2006: 223).  
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guarantees for obtaining credit and for the poor to set up businesses, after 
also being legalized of course, they could increase the scale of their 
production; they could sell more in places that are farther away. In general, 
they could accumulate. “Extralegal assets owners are thus denied access to 
the credit that would allow them to expand their operations – an essential 
step toward starting or growing a business in advanced countries. In the 
United States for example, up to 70 percent of the credit new businesses 
receive comes from using formal titles as collateral for mortgages.” (2000, 
84)  
 
The results in this respect of his registering effort have not been 
impressive. The official figures concerning the evolution of credit given to 
registered owners are those shown by Table 2.  
 
TABLE 2 



























per owner  




2000 1,054,607  249  154  66  10,000  6,600.00  0.95% 
2001 1,170,206  275  174  73  15,000  4,866.67  1.28% 
2002 1,294,003  314  197  106  20,000  5,300.00  1.55% 
2003 1,364,434  372  237  136  20,000  6,800.00  1.47% 
2004 1,430,032  459  266  160  16,000  10,000.00  1.12% 
Source:  COFOPRI, COFOPRI al día (boletín). 
 
 
  The figures show the expansion of registered titles and the number and 
amount of credits. The proportion of homeowners with registered titles that 
have mortgages has reached its peak, 1.55% in 2002, only to decrease 
afterwards.
23 
                                                 
23    Calderón (2006: 212) confirms in his studies the fear of having to recur to 
mortgaging.  
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    The economic context has to be considered in the evaluation. The 
program has been implemented during two different but similarly prolonged 
periods, one of economic stagnation and banking crises, and other of 
relatively prolonged growth. We can say that the resumption of growth since 
2003, the largest growth period in several decades, allows a first evaluation of 
the program under more favorable conditions than previous studies.   
 
The two principal sources of statistical information to compare the 
situation and the progress of those who have registered their properties from 
those who have not are the surveys called Linea de Base  of the PDPU (Urban 
Property Rights Project) of the year 2000 and the Linea de Base of 2004, 
applied to 2,726 and 2,744 owners respectively.
24  This way, one can analyze 
the diverse initial effects of the massive registering of titles by COFOPRI, 
already carried out to a great extent up to the year 2000, but continuing on a 
smaller scale in the following years, in Peru’s main cities. The figures we will 
collect are no more than an initial explorations into the subject. The 
introduction of other factors should shed more light on the reasons of the 
similarities and differences.  
 
a) As far as access to credit is concerned: do owners of registered 
households have a greater tendency to apply for credit? There doesn’t seem 
to be any difference, and if there is it isn’t significant. The households that 
applied for credit in the year 2004 made up 25% of those who had COFOPRI 
titles and the same percentage was found in the case of those who had just 
municipal and buying and selling titles. Curiously, the percentage of those 
who had other types of property documents or none at all is greater, 30% and 
29% respectively. (Webb, et.al. 2006: 63)  
 
Does having a registered title increase the probability that credit is 
approved by formal lenders? The rate of approval for solicited credits is 
similar in the case of COFOPRI titles and in those who have no title at all 
(58%), greater in the case of those who have acquired property through buy 
and sell (70%) and also in those who have another type of document (72%). 
                                                 
24   For more on this see Calderón 2006, Webb, et. al. (2006).  
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The lowest approval figure is that for municipal titles (54%). (Webb. et.al. 
2006: 63) The deepening of the property rights has not been making any 
difference. 
 
b) As far as other economic aspects are concerned did the registering 
of property correlates with a greater increase in family income? The figures 
suggest that this hasn’t been the case. The percentage of increase is the 
following: COFOPRI, 9.6%; Municipal, 6.3%; buy and sell, 13.5%, other 
documents, 5.7% and, surprisingly, those who have no property document at 
all experienced the highest increase 24.7%. 
 
Did the fully formal title increase the probability that a household will 
pay taxes? Everything seems to point in the opposite direction. The proportion 
of households that pay land taxes is 59% in the case of COFOPRI. In the case 
of titled but unregistered households it is 64% for Municipal, 73.8%, for “buy 
and sell” and 66% for another document. There is in this case, a difference 
against those who have no document, 28.9%.  
 
  ¿Was registering an incentive to start paying taxes? The figures 
gathered seem to show the opposite: 17.5% of COFOPRI owners started after 
officializing their property title, 37.7% (Municipal), 40,0% (Buy and sell), 
41% (Other document). That is, those entitled but not registered, began 
paying land taxes after their entitlement.  
 
c) In the field of human development, the contrasts are clear. ¿Does 
having a registered title boosts the improvement of households? This doesn’t 
seem to be the case, since 88% of households with COFOPRI titles had 
expanded or improved; in the case of those who had only a title granted by 
municipalities the percentage is the same and those who had acquired 
through buy and sell or had other documents have a practically similar 
percentage of 82%. Even the difference with those who had no document at 
all, just an expectative right is not so great for the figure for this case is 74% 
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Did those who registered property have faster access to public 
services? The answer is once again negative. Until the year 2004, those who 
hadn’t registered had faster access to drinking water, sewers, electricity and 
telephone than those who did have. Is there a relation between the type of 
property right and the ownership of health insurance? If there is, it turns out 
negative for those who have registered rights. Do those who have their 
property registered go more to school and are less held back? The answer is 
that there is no difference worthy of consideration with those who do not have 
it registered or even with those who have no title. (Webb, et.al. 206; 65-66)  
 
Actually, the conclusion of the authors of the study from which we have 
taken the figures points toward a conceptual criticism which deals with looking 
at the reality of rights in dichotomic terms. “The evidence…strongly contrasts 
with what one could expect in a dichotomic world, where the right of property 
is or isn’t, and where security is only possessed by the beneficiaries of 
property formalization programs, especially through COFOPRI, and where that 
same security is the key to a set of benefits.” (Webb, et.al. 2006: 66) One 
could say that if by “extra legality” we understand norms previous to the 
registering of property, then such extra legality seems to show, to this point 
in time, to be as efficient as the legality proposed by De Soto.  
 
In any case, we may conclude that the registering of titles hasn’t been 
too important until now. But it can also be that the legal dimension of the 
problem and, in particular, the holding of titles, even unregistered ones, isn’t 
that significant a factor of economic progress, at least immediately, when 
faced with other factors such as the process of urban city planning or the 
geographical location of those entitled, the economic cycle and many others. 
Even in the development of access to credit and the possibility of offering 
collateral to obtain it the title doesn’t seem to be that important. Indeed, the 
figures suggest that the great dynamism of micro credit in today’s Peru is due 
to different factors than the possibility of presenting property titles. “Presently 
Peru has one the most dynamic and developed microfinance markets of the 
world, where not only do credits for micro businesses grow at an steady rate, 
it has also given way to some innovations at the global scale.  In the last five  
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years, it is one of the most important structural changes of our economy with 
notable indicators: 44 institutions give credit to 820,000 businessmen; credits 
approach US$1,500 millions,  with a yearly growth of 25% and almost two 
thirds placed outside of Lima; the development of technology makes credit 
individual and guarantee free, overcoming the necessity of property titles; 
products adapted to the characteristics of the local market have been 
developed, such as the “self-building” (autoconstrucción) of houses by parts.” 
(Quijandría 2006)  
 
d) Other studies confirm in different ways many of these results. In a 
very widespread study it is pointed out that “Over the past decade, the 
Peruvian government issued property titles to over 1.2 million urban 
households, the largest government titling program targeted to urban 
squatters in the developing world…My estimates suggest that titling results in 
a substantial increase in labor hours, a shift in labor supply away from work at 
home to work in the outside market and substitution of adult for child labor. 
For the average squatter family, granting of a property title is associated with 
a 17% increase in total household work hours, a 47% decrease in the 
probability of working inside the home, and a 28% reduction in the probability 
of child labor” (Field 2003, 1). Field’s hypothesis has been widely commented. 
(Mathews 2005; Webb, et.al. 2006), Morris 2004, among many others). 
Indeed, the problem of the lack of security of property that she presents as 
the factor explaining the fact that having the full title offers security and 
promotes work outside the household has no empirical sustenance since 
owners without registered titles have expressed in similar numbers that they 
have no problems with the security of their property and they behave 
consistently with that appreciation.  (Webb, et.al. 2006: 15, 78-9)   
 
In another analysis the conclusion was reached that formalized owners 
have more access to credit for housing from the public sector but that “there 
is no evidence that titles increase the likelihood of receiving credit from 
private sector banks, although interest rates are significantly lower for titled  
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In a study dealing with this experience in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the 
following conclusion is reached: “More than twenty years ago, a group of 
squatters occupied a piece of land in a poor suburban area of Buenos Aires….. 
We find that entitled families increased housing investment, reduced 
household size, and improved the education of their children relative to the 
control group. However, effects on credit access are modest and there are no 
effects on labor income” (Galiani & Schargrodsky; 2005, 2) 
 
For a long standing scholar of the urbanization process in Peru, the 
conclusion is that “few steps have taken towards the formalization of society. 
The financial market continues to be segmented…Unlike what it was thought, 
the extended formalization of property has not affected the recourse to 
informal credit nor has it increased proclivity to use formal credits. Only a 
handful of risk-taking micro businessmen, with a level of accumulation that is 
superior to simple reproduction, have been able to make good use of the 
advantages mortgaging.” (Calderón 2006: 229-230) 
 
Maybe it is true that “the socio economic objectives of the PDPU are 
achieved gradually. Hence, it is not reasonable to expect, in the short term, 
dramatic changes in the living conditions of formalized residents.” (Morris 
2004: 151) But that the value of traditional local institutions is not 
unimportant, as it is evidenced when comparing the results on the access to 
credit and other services, also applies.
26  
                                                 
25   The scarce effect of the De Soto’s program concerning credit access is especially 
serious if, as he pointed out: “Unfortunately the titling program has only 
touched a small part of the population that happens to be least poor, because 
we started in the relatively richest places.” (De Soto 2005) A contrary opinion 
concerning this point comes from Calderón (2006: 201) 
26   Feder and Feeny (1993) acknowledge it in their summary of the theory of land 
tenure and property rights. More recently in, Easterly (2006)  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  In this section we shall extract some conclusions by referring to what 
has been pointed out above, but also presenting some reflections.  
 
The experience of registering private property, and specifically homes 
in Peru shows that De Soto’s pretensions expressed in the much announced 
leap in the economic progress of poor countries and people, to the point of 
becoming nothing short of a world revolution, are obviously much 
exaggerated. As one of the first evaluations published by the World Bank and 
by the very same institution that is in charge of the registering, COFOPRI, 
point out: “an important conclusion of the study is that the formalization and 
the titling of lands are by themselves not sufficient to bring about the 
economic and social benefits that scholars like Hernando De Soto attribute to 
it.” (Morris 2004, 30)
27 I t  i s  n o t  e a s y  t o  f i n d  w h a t  k i n d  o f  p o l i c i e s  a n d  
programs could do the gigantic revolutionary intellectual and practical job De 
Soto assigned to himself. We, therefore, do not have a better alternative to 
do it. All we can do is to summarize and add some elements that could help 
understand the power and limits of his ideas, and one of the limits is that the 
scope of the challenge, and the simplicity of means ends up making the 
argument politically unconvincing.  
 
The impressive international media and, mostly libertarian think-tank 
support, as well as the amount of official, national and multilateral resources 
received, contributed  to the spread of his ideas, and of the ILD’s work in 
several countries. Some research has to be done on the methods, strengths 
and limits of this type of backing, but as the CV presented above suggests, it 
is at the level of the promoters where most of the influence concentrates. As 
far as we know, there is not, for instance, some “pro-small business property 
legalization” social mobilization, or some international network of civil society 
organizations pushing in that same direction. 
 
                                                 
27   In the same line Webb, et.al. (2006), Woodruff (2001), Calderón 2006, 237.  
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On the influence of the theoretical dimension of De Soto’s work we will 
not insist on the difficulties we presented above. The difficulty to legally 
register micro enterprises resides in the higher cost of behaving according to 
the law, and not as the author insists in the cost of becoming formal. We 
think that this is why the author concentrates in his second book on a 
previous step: getting credit through the mortgaging of their homes. We want 
to add to that one aspect of his general approach. In times like these, faced 
with the persistence of poverty and economic inequality in the world, there is 
a wider consciousness about the complexity of the social reality and the 
multidimensionality of poverty,
28 y e t  D e  S o t o  c h o o s e s  s o m e  s o r t  o f  
accumulated reductionism that helps to spread ideas but makes his proposals 
quite risky in terms of the achievement of practical end results; in his case, 
economic progress. Let us illustrate this point. First, the author defines 
progress in strictly economic terms. No other dimensions of life are considered 
equivalent when establishing the most important goals.
29 Second, to the 
reductionism on the side of the goals he adds another on the side of the 
means since he insists in that the key to economic progress is legal, leaving 
aside a set of aspects such as economic (for example, the competitiveness of 
micro businesses, types of land markets), political (democracy and 
dictatorship) and cultural (the significance of housing for its owner), etc. that 
are not simple corollaries at the moment of explaining reality.
30 Third, within 
the legal field his proposals fit in the category of “property rights 
reductionism”.
31 But, and fourth, the property rights needed are understood 
as private property rights. Other types of property rights tend to be 
categorised by default as part of the ‘extra-legal’ world. The problem is that 
the reductionism in the approach proposed by De Soto does not help when it 
comes to incorporate other significant, substitute or complementary 
elements.
32 Fifth, the vision he has of these private rights is also narrow; he 
                                                 
28   On the complexity of human motivations and in the world of business see Sen 
(2003).   
29   For example, access to basic services such as hygiene, electricity, health care. 
Morris (2004), Keefer (2004), Webb, et.al. (2006), Calderón (2006).  
30   See an attemopt of presenting that complexity, including that cultural dimension 
in Calderón (2005 and 2006) 
31   Rodrik (2004) as stated by Chang (2006).  
32    Essays to widen the range of intervening elements are, for example, Loayza 
(1997), Loayza, et.al.,(2006)   
  32 
concentrates on the right to alienate goods to obtain credit, and this makes it 
difficult to comprehend the set of human relations that are established around 
property.
33 What’s more, and in sixth place, in the field of credit the author’s 
focus on the existence, or not, of mortgage guarantees disregards the actual 
reality of the impressive expansion of microcredit not based on such 
guarantees not only in the case of informal credit, but also of NGO’s and 
national and regional public and private banks. Who knows, maybe in the 
future the similarities with the actual reality of the United States, on which De 
Soto relies, will be greater, but at the moment the centrality of this vision of 
the functioning of the small scale credit system constitutes a transposition of 
foreign and rich-country working methods. Reductionism is dangerous when 
one seeks to avoid top-down approaches in institutional reforms.
34  
 
  From the economic development side of the problem, we consider that 
important connections are generally left aside, such as the relation between 
productivity and competitiveness in the market on the one hand, and the will 
to formalize on the other. That is what happens when one insists unilaterally, 
like De Soto, that legality is the requirement for the increase of productivity, 
something that is, for all intents and purposes, his main point.
35 The 
reasoning is therefore guilty of being unidirectional. The relation between 
economics and legality is sufficiently complex and both also dependent on 
factors from other spheres of human activity so as to, at least, think about a 
bidirectional relation between the two. 
 
  On the policy side, the lengthiest experience of home’s registration 
promoted by ILD, the one carried out in Peru through COFOPRI, has shown 
                                                 
33   See Grey (2000). 
34    While reading the narrative of experiences in The Other Path, we get the 
impression that De Sot considers that all forms of property and organization 
that have been the base for settling in the city and for operating tin the market 
have expired and should give way to registered private property as the true 
legal property. Hence, the many forms of  formal legality should not be 
considered simply as ‘extra legal.’ That simplification contributes to a dichotomic 
vision of the reality of property regimes that is highlighted by Webb, et.al. 
(2006: 66-7)  
35   If productivity and the resulting competitiveness is a condition for productive 
assets to acquire a value in the market, then the value of legality depends on 
both. “Legal title is not worthwhile when the assets are not valuable.” (Easterly 
2006: 81)    
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that its effects on the access to credit are small and not, at the moment, 
significantly different from other methods of recognizing property rights. 
Previous to the ILD’s campaign and more ad-hoc methods of social and state 
recognition of property rights seem to offer similar security and to have equal, 
and sometimes better economic and human development consequences than 
the ones promoted by De Soto. We do not believe that ILD’s public 
registration work in Peru has been redundant but, until now, it hasn’t 
produced a significant change. That is the main result of the empirical work. 
One reason may have been the “top-down” approach implemented.
36 
 
Another reason why registration programs do not lead to the expected 
increase in home mortgages and the creation of business by the poor is that 
the assumption of the predominance of a propensity of migrants to take on 
commercial risks with their housing goes against the poor’s main objectives. 
The agonizing struggle to settle with their families is only recent history as De 
Soto himself illustrates in his most historical narrations.  
 
Maybe the legal registration of home property ends up being beneficiary 
further ahead and will widen the field of action of the poor at the moment of 
deciding what risks to take.
37 Meanwhile, the desire to have a home in which 
to live in with the whole family for an indefinite period of time will by far 
dominate over the desire to take risks by mortgaging it; particularly the risk 
of landing in a situation that is highly rejected in Peru and elsewhere, that of 
being homeless.     
 
  That De Soto’s himself didn’t even seek a minimum of formal analytical 
rigor, that the power of his ideas have been the result of campaigns 
orchestrated by a powerful group of institutions that betted for them with 
great enthusiasm, pedagogical skill and resources, and that the effects of the 
public registering of property promoted by him have not even come close to 
what was expected by its promoters does not imply ignoring an 
unquestionable contribution by De Soto: the recognition of the poor as agents 
                                                 
36    On the top-down and bottom-up distinction in property regimes see Easterly 
(2006: 79-89) 
37   Calderón (2005, 2006: 224)  
  34 
of their own development in a world, like Peru, in which they were seen, and 
still are, as patients and not agents.  
  
  35 
Appendix:  Power and influence of the idea 
 
  There is no better way to complement this paper on the power and 
influence of ideas than reproducing most of the World Bank’s web page on 
Hernando De Soto’s Curriculum Vitae.  
 
De Soto’s CV starts as follows: “Hernando de Soto is President of the 
Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) —headquartered in Lima, Peru— 
considered by The Economist as one of the two most important think tanks 
in the world. Time magazine chose him as one of the five leading Latin 
American innovators of the century in its special May 1999 issue “Leaders for 
the New Millennium”, and included him among the 100 most influential people 
in the world in 2004. Mr. De Soto was also listed as one of 15 innovators “who 
will reinvent your future” according to Forbes magazine’ 85th anniversary 
edition. In January 2000, Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit, the German 
development magazine, described Mr. De Soto as one of the most important 
development theoreticians of the last millennium. In 2005, Prospect 
magazine of the UK and Foreign Policy of the US have included him in their 
joint list of the world’s top 100 ‘public intellectuals’”.
38   
 
The next two paragraphs show some personal biographical data, he is 
Peruvian, and summarize the “deeds.” Let us quote the second of these two: 
“Currently, Mr. de Soto together with his colleagues at the ILD, is focused on 
designing and implementing capital formation programs to empower the poor 
in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and former Soviet Union 
Nations. Some 30 heads of state have invited de Soto to carry out these ILD 
programs in their countries.” Second, where he is coming from and his main 
practical activity. That is his, we could call it, product. 
                                                 
38   http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.ns/Content/competition_judge_soto 
Probably there are many more of these praises but we add the most recent 
designation as one of the twelve most important economists in the world ever 
by the Swiss-German publishing house Orell Füssli that published The Other 
Path in German in 1992. El Comercio, Lima:  July 11, 2007, p. b5.  
  36 
Then the titles of his two books are mentioned. The first is The Other 
Path. The Invisible Revolution in the Third World.
39 The second in entitled The 
Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else.
40 He correctly annotates that both books have been 
international bestsellers, and translated into some 20 languages. The 
message seems to be that the theoretical component of his ideas has spread 
widely, and is accessible to everybody. 
 
  For our purposes it is important to transcribe the paragraph on prizes 
and awards selected. “Among the prizes he has received are The Freedom 
Prize (Switzerland), The Fisher Prize (United Kingdom). In 2002, he 
received The Goldwater Award (USA), The Adam Smith Award  from the 
Association  of Private Enterprise Education (USA), and The CARE Canada 
Award for Outstanding Development Thinking (Canada). In 2003, he received 
the Downey Fellowship at Yale University and the Democracy Hall of 
Fame International Award from the National Graduate University (USA). In 
2004, he was given The Templeton Freedom Prize (USA) and The Milton 
Friedman Prize (USA), as well as the Royal Decoration of the Most 
Admirable Order of the Direkgunabhorn, 5
th Class, (Thailand).”  
 
And the last paragraph of this brief summary refers to the academic 
honors. The University of Buckingham (Honorary Degree of Doctor in Letters, 
UK) and Dartmouth College (Fellow of the Class of 1930) are among the 
institutions mentioned. Also the America’s Award (USA), the Prize of Deutsche 
Stiftung Eigentum, Golden Plate Award (USA, Forbes, and the Peruvian 
National Assembly of Rectors. It is well known that he has not attempted a 
more important presence in academic circles.
41 
 
                                                 
39   New York: Harper & Row, Publishers. We will refer here to the First Perennial 
Library Edition, 2000. The original was published in Spanish in November 1986. 
40   Published originally in English by Basic Books, New York, 2000.   The Spanish 
translation is published also in 2000. 
41    The autor is not mentioned in Desmond McNeil (2004) “The informal sector. 
Biography of an idea”. In: Global Institutions and Development. Framing the 
world? by Boas, M. and McNeil, D. London: Routledge, pp. 41-55.  
  37 
This quite impressive summary has an order of self-presentation that 
shows, seem so to us, some order of importance to elaborate a profile. His CV 
includes, personal prestige and influence in the world-class media, then where 
he comes from, what he is doing and offering, and finally the prizes and 
awards reflecting the worldwide appreciation for his activity and ideas.  
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